Resilient Power Sharing in a 100% Inverter-Based Power System Under GPS Spoofing Attacks
Abstract
Utilizing power sharing controllers in a fully inverter-based power system (FIBPS) improves the system response to disturbances, despite the lack of mechanical inertia.
However, a power sharing controller synchronizes its internal clock with the global positioning system (GPS) to improve its timing accuracy.
This may expose the power sharing controller to a GPS spoofing attack that disrupts its operation.
This paper proposes a power sharing strategy for an FIBPS that is resilient to GPS spoofing attacks.
The impact of a GPS spoofing attack on the employed grid-supporting power sharing controller is studied.
Then, a state observer is designed to estimate the voltage angle of the grid-supporting inverter.
Finally, a control loop is designed to mitigate GPS spoofing attack by correcting the voltage angle according to its estimated value.
The performance of the proposed method is evaluated using time-domain simulation case studies on the IEEE 9-bus benchmark system in PSCAD/EMTDC software.
Key words: Cyberattack; GPS spoofing; power control; power sharing; renewable energy sources
Authors
All are of Virginia Tech.