Securing Chiplet-Based Semiconductor Manufacturing from Untrusted Supply Chains
Dr. Tanvir Arafin
KEY INTERESTS
Hardware security and trust issues in emerging computing platforms
AFFILIATIONS
Assistant Professor, Department of Cyber Security Engineering, George Mason University
ACADEMIC DEGREES
BS, Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology
MS, Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland
PhD, Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland
SECURING CHIPLET-BASED SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING FROM UNSTRUSTED SUPPLY CHAINS
Monolithic integrated circuit (IC) design is reaching the physical limit to accommodate Moore’s law. To address this, novel design primitives have emerged that move from monolithic design practices to heterogeneous integration of IC primitives in a 2.5 or 3D structure. For example, multiple chiplets (i.e., small, independent chips with defined functionalities) can be connected on a single substrate to create a high-density, high-performance integrated circuit. Chiplets usher in a new additive design paradigm in microelectronics, where chips from multiple vendors and process technologies are integrated efficiently with better yield and less wafer waste. However, from a hardware security perspective, insecure supply chains introduce new vulnerabilities for chiplet-based technology, such as hardware Trojans and counterfeit tiles. This project will design provable trust embedding techniques for counterfeit chiplet detection in this project. In addition, it will seek to develop novel Trojan identification methods using the built-in-peer-testing capabilities of chiplets connected on a shared Universal Chiplet Interconnect Express (UCIe) bus.